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Judicial Responses to the EEOC's Failure To Attempt 
Conciliation 
Under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,1 the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or the Com-
mission) may bring suit2 against employers3 who discriminate in 
their employment practices.4 Before filing suit, the Commission 
must "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment 
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-
suasion."5 The Commission may sue only if it cannot obtain an ac-
ceptable conciliation agreement.6 
EEOC regulations acknowledge that the Commission must at-
tempt conciliation before bringing suit.7 The scope of the suit may 
change, however, after initial conciliation talks. 8 If the EEOC adds 
l. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). 
This Act amends Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,253 
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-16 (1976)). The Act, as amended, will be 
referred to in text as Title VII. 
2. If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission ... the Commission 
has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the 
Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent ... named 
in the charge. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976). 
3. The act prohibits discriminatory employment practices by employers, employment 
agencies or labor organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1976). 
4. The specific practices prohibited are detailed at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to -3 (1976). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976). An individual plaintiff may sue regardless of whether 
the Commission has attempted conciliation or not. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 
F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969). 
1. See EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907, 911 (D. Md. 1974), ajfd. in 
part, revd. in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976); see generally 29 
C.F.R. § 1601.24 (1982). 
8, Problems generally arise when the scope of the complaint exceeds the scope of the con-
ciliation talks. For example, the complaint may name a party not included in conciliation. 
See, e.g., EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974) 
(conciliation talks included employer but not union). The complaint may contain charges of 
discrimination not discussed during conciliation. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sherwood Medical In-
dus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (portion of complaint alleging sex discrimination was 
dismissed where conciliation covered only race discrimination). The complaint may cover 
employees not discussed during conciliation. See, e.g., EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. 
Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (granting partial summary judgment on portion of complaint 
covering management, professional and technical personnel where conciliation only covered 
flight attendants). 
Problems can also arise when the scope of conciliation far exceeds the scope of the com-
plaint. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (alternative holding). In the Sears cases, 
. the EEOC initiated conciliation with Sears' national headquarters concerning nationwide dis-
crimination. When conciliation failed, the EEOC filed several suits against a few specific Sears 
stores. Two courts held such conciliation inadequate because these stores were given no op-
portunity to comply with the law voluntarily before suit. 650 F.2d at 19; 490 F. Supp. at 1255. 
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new defendants or charges to the suit, prior conciliation may no 
longer satisfy the statutory prerequisite.9 Courts have held that in-
adequate conciliation efforts or bad faith attempts10 do not fulfill the 
statutory prerequisite to suit. 11 
When the EEOC fails to satisfy the statute's conciliation require-
ment, courts refuse to hear the merits of a case.12 The procedural 
disposition of such a case, however, varies. The statute authorizes 
staying proceedings pending further conciliation, 13 and courts have 
Faced with identical facts, two other courts reached different results. A federal district court in 
Georgia found no fault with the conciliation efforts. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 22 Empl. 
Prac. Dec. (CCH) ~ 30,768 (N.D. Ga. 1980). A suit in Illinois alleging nationwide discrimina-
tion survived a motion to dismiss because it was coextensive with the scope of conciliation. 
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
9. Courts are generally reluctant to review the content of conciliation negotiations. See 
EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527,533 (10th Cir. 1978) ("a court should not examine the details 
of the offers and counteroffers between parties .... "); EEOC v. North Cent. Airlines, 475 F. 
Supp. 667 (D. Minn. 1979); cf. EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Chestnut Run & 
Affiliated Facilities, 373 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Del. 1974) (court refused to examine merits of 
EEOC determination of reasonable cause), qffd., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975). When a de-
fendant claims that the Commission failed to attempt conciliation regarding particular charges 
or a particular defendant, however, courts will examine the validity of that claim. See EEOC 
v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678, 684 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Allegheny 
Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
10. Even when conciliation talks included all the issues raised by the complaints, some 
courts examined the history of the negotiations to determine the EEOC's good faith. See 
EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); EEOC v. Zia 
Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978). 
11. See, e.g., EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 531-32 (10th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1257-58 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v. International Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341,346 (D. Mass. 1979); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 
F. Supp. 678, 682-84 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300, 1305-
07 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
Since most failures to fulfill the conciliation requirement arise from partial conciliation, 
this Note will refer only to "inadequate conciliation." This term includes bad faith attempts to 
conciliate as well as complete failure to attempt conciliation. The term also includes situations 
in which the EEOC in good faith, but mistakenly, believes that the concilation requirement 
has been satisfied. 
12. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Klingler 
Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 
635 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 
1980) (per curiam); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978); Patterson v. American 
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (alternative holding); EEOC v. International 
Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical fodus., 
452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 
1978); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC v. Brown 
Transp. Co., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1976); EEOC v. National Cash 
Register Co., 405 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ga. 1975); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. 
Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), qffd in part, revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 
590 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 
1974); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974). 
13. The statute explicitly allows the court "in its discretion [to] stay further proceedings for 
not more than sixty days pending . . . further efforts of the Commission to obtain voluntary 
compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976). 
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identified circumstances under which they will grant a stay.14 The 
statute does not state what a court must do where a stay is inappro-
priate.15 Thus, courts have, in their discretion, disposed of suits by 
either dismissal of the complaint16 or summary judgment for the 
defendant. 17 
Dismissal and summary judgment evoke different conse-
quences.18 As a decision on the merits, 19 summary judgment has res 
judicata effect and bars any subsequent action by the EEOC based 
upon the same charge.20 Dismissal, on the other hand, is generally 
14. See EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); EEOC v. 
Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 
F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978); EEOC v. Canadian Indem. Co., 407 F. Supp. 1366 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
Typically, courts stay proceedings when the parties seem close to agreement, as in Canadian 
Indemnity, or when the EEOC clearly attempted conciliation, but EEOC bad faith caused the 
negotiations to fail, as in Pet and Zia. Where the EEOC fails to attempt conciliation, courts 
generally refuse to exercise their discretion to stay proceedings. E.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 
375 F. Supp. 237, 244 (N.D. Ala. 1974). This result accords with the plain meaning of the 
statute, which provides for a stay pending jurther efforts of the Commission to obtain volun-
tary compliance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (emphasis added). The language suggests that 
some efforts must have already been made. 
15. In leaving the availability of a stay to the discretion of the trial court, Congress indi-
cates that other orders disposing of the suit are also appropriate. 
16. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Magno-
lia Elec. Power Assn., 635 F.2d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 1981); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 
535 F.2d 257, 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Home of Economy, 
Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1592 (D.N.D. May 20, 1982); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 
(M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978). 
17. See, e.g., EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 
1979); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (partial summary 
judgment); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), affd in part, 
revd in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United 
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 
F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974). 
18. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2713, 
at 391 (1973). 
19. FED. R. C1v. P. 56; 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.03 (2d ed. 1982) 
("The,,tenor of Rule 56 indicates that the summary judgment procedure deals with the merits 
.... ). 
20. See 6 J. MOORE, supra note 19, §_56.03 ("[If summary judgment is granted] in favor of 
the defendant the judgment is in bar and not in abatement."); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 
supra note 18, § 2713, at 405 ("A summary judgment •.. is on the merits and purports to have 
a res judicata effect on any later action."). 
Note that in a more recent volume of this treatise, the authors propose modifying this 
approach. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 4444 (1981). They suggest that when a plaintiff seeks to rebring an action that a court has 
previously refused to hear, the second court should determine whether the action was barred, 
not by looking to the original order - either dismissal or summary judgment - but by con-
sidering whether barring the action would promote justice. Id., at 392. This flexible applica-
tion of the claim preclusion doctrine finds additional support in the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 20(2): 
A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on the prematurity 
of the action or on the plaintiffs failure to satisfy a precondition to suit, does not bar 
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without prejudice,21 and leaves the Commission free to pursue fur-
ther conciliation talks and to return to court should the talks fail.22 
This Note suggests that a court faced with inadequate concilia-
tion e.ff orts by the EEOC should dismiss the action without 
prejudice. Part I argues that dismissal better serves the remedial 
purpose of the statute than summary judgment. Part II then demon-
strates that dismissal satisfies the policy concerns of courts that dis-
pose of inadequately conciliated suits. Although dismissal may not 
promote judicial efficiency as well as summary judgment, courts and 
the Commission can handle the dismissal to minimize duplication. 
Part III advances dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted as the appropriate procedural vehicle for dis-
another action by the plaintiff instituted after the claim has matured, or the precondition 
has been satified, unless a second action is precluded by operation of the substantive law. 
The difficulty with this in the context of summary judgment concerns the function of summary 
adjudication. Summary judgment serves the primary purpose of speedily adjudicating merit-
less claims. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 99, at 492 (3d ed. 1976) (sum-
mary judgment is a "salutary and efficient instrumentality for expedition of the business of the 
courts."). Inviting collateral attack on summary judgments to test whether they rest on the 
failure to meet "a precondition" or on "the operation of substantive law" conflicts directly with 
the judicial economy that justifies summary adjudication in the first instance. 
In any event, courts disposing of suits for inadequate conciliation have apparently assumed 
that an order of summary judgment will bar subsequent suits by the same litigants on the same 
charges. See EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 249 (N.D. Ala. 
1974) ("The Court is aware, of course, of the effect of its summary judgment upon the employ-
ees for whom the Commission seeks redress."); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 
994 (D. Md. 1974) ("[T]he EEOC urges the court to be mindful of the res judicala effects of a 
summary judgment in this case. The court is mindful."). This assumption reflects the nearly 
universal preponderance of authority. See, e.g., Martucci v. Mayer, 210 F.2d 259,260 (3d Cir, 
1954) (per curiam) ("A judgment under Rule 56 goes to the merits and operates in bar of the 
cause of action, not in abatement."); Garrigan v. Giese, 420 F. Supp. 68, 71 (E.D. Mo. 1976) 
("A determination by summary judgment is as final a judgment as is a determination had after 
a trial or hearing on uncontroverted facts."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977); Hubicki v. 
United Steelworkers of America, 344 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affd. sub nom. 
Hubicki v. ACF Indus., 484 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1973); Sopp v. Gehrlein, 236 F. Supp. 823, 825 
(W.D. Pa. 1964) (''The authorities all agree that the entry of summary judgment against a 
plaintiff is a general judgment in favor of a defendant and is an effective bar under the doc-
trine of res judicata to a subsequent action between the same parties on the same cause of 
action."); Oregon v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 276,277 (D. Or. 1961) ("A summary judgment 
goes to the merits of the case and operates in bar of the cause of the action."), affd., 308 F.2d 
568 (9th Cir. 1962). Since courts seem to assume that claim preclusion automatically follows 
summary judgment, this Note will discuss this issue as a choice between summary judgment 
with res judicata effects and dismissal without prejudice. 
21. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v. 
Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978); see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 
18, § 2713, at 404-05. 
22. The need to file a second suit will not prejudice the Commission's case. Available back 
pay is measured from the time the employee files a charge with the Commission, regardless of 
when the suit is filed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). No statute oflimitations applies to suits 
by the EEOC under title VII. Occidential Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977). The 
employer may attack the timeliness of a suit only if he can show prejudice. 432 U.S. at 373. 
See also EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (applying Adminis-
_trative Procedure Act's requirement that agencies proceed without "unreasonable delay" to 
dismiss EEOC suit based on charges five to seven years old). 
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posing of actions when the Commission has failed to satisfy the con-
ciliation requirement. 
I. DISPOSITION To PROMOTE THE POLICY OF THE STATUTE 
Courts consistently refuse to hear any case in which the EEOC 
failed to make an adequate conciliation effort before filing suit. 23 
The trial judge may dispose of such suits either by dismissing the 
complaint or by granting summary judgment. Decisions announcing 
the disposition of such cases, however, do not acknowledge the 
choice between dismissing and granting summary judgment.24 In 
practice, courts apparently dispose of unconciliated cases simply by 
granting the defendant's motion, whether for dismissal or summary 
judgment.25 Courts are not legally bound to grant or deny the de-
23. See note 12 supra. Courts have hinted only occasionally that they might entertain a 
suit despite inadequate conciliation. One case stated that the Fifth Circuit has apparently 
established a rule that an EEOC suit cannot be dismissed for failure to comply with Title VII's 
statutory prerequisites, like conciliation, unless the failure was deliberate or prejudiced the 
defendant. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1254 n.17, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 
1980). The Sears court drew this rule from EEOC v. Airguide Corp., 539 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 
1976), a case involving Title VII's notice requirement. InAirguide, the EEOC mailed notice of 
the charge to respondent, but the company never received the letter. Because EEOC did 
everything it could to meet the requirement, and the defendant was not shown to have suffered 
prejudice due to lack of timely notice, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment and remanded the case for a determination of prejudice to the defendant. 
539 F.2d at 1042. The rule established by the Fifth Circuit inAirguide should not apply to the 
conciliation requirement. The strength of the legislative history supporting the conciliation 
requirement, see note 42 infra and accompanying text, distinguishes it from the relatively un-
remarked notice requirement, and makes it unlikely that the Fifth Circuit, or any other court, 
will allow the EEOC to fail to attempt conciliation. One authority, callingAirguide "scarcely 
definitive," suggests that the case provides "little assistance to other courts except in the precise 
situation decided." C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION§ 3.ll(b), at 331, 332 (1980). 
Some courts find that negotiations not strictly part of the conciliation process nonetheless 
fulfill the conciliation requirements. For example, in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum In-
dus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976), the court held that negoti-
ating a consent decree fulfilled the conciliation requirement. 517 F.2d at 869. The court in 
Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976), 
rejected the idea that negotiations begun after suit was filed were sufficient, but left open "the 
possibility that exceptional circumstances may excuse a failure to attempt conciliation . . . ." 
535 F.2d at 272. In EEOC v. Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D.N.Y. 
1977), the court held that presuit correspondence notifying the defendant that the EEOC in-
tended to broaden the scope ofits discrimination charges fulfilled the conciliation requirement. 
434 F. Supp. at I 166-67. 
24. Two courts discussed their refusal to stay proceedings pending further conciliation ef-
forts. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 (M.D. 'Ala. 1980); EEOC 
v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 245-46 (N.D. Ala. 1974). Both courts 
held that an opportunity to negotiate settlements after the EEOC files suit does not fulfill the 
statutory requirement that the EEOC provide the employer an opportunity for conciliation 
talks prior to filing suit. 490 F. Supp. at 1258; 375 F. Supp. at 245; see note 2 supra. 
25. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980); EEOC v. 
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979); EEOC v. Wilson & 
Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978); EEOC v. East Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 
985 (W.D. Pa. 1978); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977); EEOC 
v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Va. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 532 F.2d 359 
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fondant's motion as labeled; they may convert the motion into the 
appropriate form.26 Generally, they have not exercised this power. 
In nearly every case where the defendant's motion specified either 
dismissal or summary judgment, the court adopted that characteriza-
tion for its order.27 This practice clearly affords defendants unwar-
ranted power and allows unjustifiable inconsistency in the outcome 
of similar suits.28 
Instead, courts should consistently dismiss, without prejudice, in-
adequately conciliated suits. Dismissal does not affect the remedial 
goal of the statute as severely as does summary judgment. Title VII 
seeks to eliminate prejudicial discrimination in employment.29 The 
1972 Act provides the EEOC with two means of pursuing this goal: 
conciliation30 and litigation.31 Dismissal leaves the EEOC free to 
employ both options. Following dismissal, the Commission may re-
new conciliation efforts.32 If conciliation fails, the Commission may 
(4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 
1974); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273 (D. Md. 1973). 
In one lone case, a district court responded to defendant's motion for summary judgment 
for failure to conciliate by dismissing for failure to satisfy conditions precedent to suit. See 
EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982). 
26. If, on a motion asserting ... failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment . . . . 
FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b); see EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1982); cf. 
EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court erred in grant• 
ing defendant's motion to dismiss, where court should have granted stay). 
27. In four cases, defendants filed alternative motions for dismissal and summary judg-
ment. None of the courts explained why it opted for one or the other. EEOC v. Sherwood 
Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. Brown Transp. Corp., 15 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1976); EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. 
Supp. 562 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (both motions denied); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 
F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), affd in part, revd in par/ and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 
590 (4th Cir. 1976). 
28. For example, EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978), and EEOC 
v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974), presented nearly 
identical factual situations and theories to the court. In both cases the Commission failed to 
include the union in conciliation talks with the employer. In neither case was there any discus-
sion of EEOC misconduct. Yet in Wilson the court dismissed without prejudice, 452 F. Supp. 
at 205, while in U.S. Pipe the court granted summary judgment. 375 F. Supp. at 249. 
For other examples of cases with similar fact situations but different outcomes, see EEOC 
v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981) (comparing itself to U.S. Pipe); 
compare Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
920 (1976), with EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 
1979); compare EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ga. 1975), with 
EEOC v. East Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. Pa. 1978). 
29. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
News 2391, 2401 ("The purpose of this title is to eliminate ... discrimination in employment 
.... "). 
30. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
31. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
32. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202, 205 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (court, in 
dismissing, stated that "the commission, union and employer should make a sincere attempt to 
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bring a new suit against the defendant. 33 
In contrast, summary judgment renders further action by the 
EEOC ineffectual. The res judicata effect of summary judgment 
bars the Commission from subsequently filing suit on the same 
charges.34 Without the threat of suit, the employer has little incen-
tive to negotiate a settlement.35 Thus, further conciliation efforts 
would probably fail. Summary judgment virtually compels the 
EEOC to rely on suits brought by the charging individuals as the 
only means of remedying discrimination. 
Congress has expressed dissatisfaction with reliance on individ-
ual suits.36 The 1972 amendments to Title VII shifted the onus of 
enforcement from individuals to the government.37 According to the 
Act's legislative history, Congress feared that individuals lacked the 
capability and the motivation to pursue judicial relief. 38 Yet courts 
that order summary judgment entrust the statute's enforcement 
solely to individual suits, a result clearly contrary to congressional 
intent.39 
Dismissal interferes less than summary judgment with Title VII's 
resolve the controversy through conference and conciliation"). Note that the statute explicitly 
provides for further conciliation during a stay. See note 13 supra. 
33. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text 
34. See note 20 supra. 
35. See notes 57-59 infra and accompanying text. 
36. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 2137, 2144; 118 Cong. Rec. 4941 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). 
31. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1971) ("It is expected that [private suits] 
will be the exception and not the rule."); see also General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 
(1980) (''The EEOC was to bear the primary burden of litigation ... " under the 1972 Act.); 
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 1976). 
38. Recognizing the disparity between litigants, the Senate Report called the private em-
ployment discrimination suit a" 'modem day David and Goliath confrontation'." S. REP. No. 
415, supra note 37, at 17 (footnote omitted). The Report also observed that "those persons 
whose economic disadvantage was a prime reason for enactment of equal employment oppor-
tunity provisions find that their only recourse in the face of unyielding discrimination [private 
suits] is one that is time consuming, burdensome, and all too often, financially prohibitive." 
Id. at 4. 
39. Conceivably, summary judgment against the Commission may also bar suits by the 
individual complainant. The Act provides: 
The person . • . aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the 
Commission . . . . [I]f within one hundred and eighty days from the filings of such charge 
. • . the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section . • . the Commission 
. . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days . . . a civil action may be 
brought against the respondent named in the charge • • . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)(l). This language would seem to permit private suits only if the Com-
mission has not filed a suit. See McLain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 
1977); Crump v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 637, 637-38 (E.D. Mo. 1973). 
Dicta in various cases suggest that summary judgment against the Commission will result 
in barring subsequent prosecution of the underlying individual claims. See EEOC v. Burling-
ton N., Inc., 644 F.2d 717, 721 n.14 (8th Cir. 1981) ("Implicit in our holding is the possibility 
that if bad faith or prejudice is shown, relief for a charging party, who has relied on the EEOC 
to litigate her claim, may be barred."); Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 
1980); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 249 (N.D. Ala. 1974) 
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purpose of eliminating employment discrimination. Summary judg-
ment impedes rather than promotes that purpose by foreclosing any 
subsequent EEOC action and jeopardizing individual suits. Dismis-
sal, on the other hand, leaves the prospects for enforcement exactly 
where they stood before the Commission filed suit. 
II. DISPOSITION To PROMOTE THE PoLiCIES RECOGNIZED BY THE 
COURTS 
In refusing to hear suits before the Commission has made an ad-
equate conciliation effort, courts deter judicial enforcement of Title 
VII's primary goal. In disposing of such suits, however, courts pro-
mote other policies. These policies - encouraging voluntary com-
pliance through conciliation, punishing misconduct by the EEOC, 
and promoting judicial efficiency - do not suffer, and may benefit, 
from decisions to dismiss rather than to grant summary judgment.40 
(''The court is aware, of course, of the effect of its summary judgment upon the employees for 
whom the Commission seeks redress."). 
Trovillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520,521 (5th Cir. 1980), illustrates an alter-
native approach, based on a jurisdictional analysis of the conciliation requirement. The Fifth 
Circuit concluded that "the judgment in Suit I [EEOC v. King's Daugthers Hosp., 12 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 484 (S.D. Miss. 1976)] has no res judicata effects as to the EEOC 
.... " 614 F.2d at 525. As such it could have no res judicata effects against the individual 
claimant. 614 F.2d at 525. For a discussion of the opinion's rationale, see notes 88-92 iefra 
and accompanying text. The court refused to limit Mrs. Trovillion to her right to intervention 
because "[t]here is no right and no obligation to intervene in a defective suit." 614 F.2d at 526. 
A subsequent Fifth Circuit opinion indicates the uncertainty in this area. Less than a 
month after Truvil/ion, Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980), held that 
dismissal with prejudice in an EEOC action can and did bar a subsequent individual action on 
the same charge. Wisdom, J., wrote the opinion in both cases. In both he characterized the 
district court orders as dismissals that did not specify ''without prejudice." Interpreting FED. 
R. C1v. P. 41(b), he concluded that the dismissal in Truvillion (for failure to investigate a 
charge thoroughly) was without prejudice, 614 F.2d at 524-25, but the dismissal in Jones (for 
inordinate delay in processing the charge and filing suit) was with prejudice. 614 F.2d at 1390. 
, The conciliation requirement is more closely akin to the investigation requirement; both arise 
from the same section of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). Jones strongly suggests, 
however, that a prior order of summary judgment can be held to bar an individual suit. 
40. Courts do not seem to link the policies they are serving to their choice of disposition. 
Thus there is no obvious preference for dismissal or summary judgment among courts that 
encourage conciliation, compare Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976), and EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 
(M.D. Ala. 1980), and EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978), 
and EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (all dismissing suit), with 
EEOC v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979), and EEOC v. 
Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977), and EEOC v. United States Pipe & 
Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974), and EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 
985 (D. Md. 1974) (all granting summary judgment), courts that seek to punish EEOC miscon-
duct, compare EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1974), affd. in 
part, revd. in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976), and EEOC v. 
Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974) (both granting summary judgment), with 
EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1978) (granting stay), and EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (alternative holding dismissing suit), courts that 
are protecting their jurisdiction, compare EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. 
Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979), and EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907 (D. 
Md. 1974), affd. in part, revd. in part and remanded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 
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A. Encouraging Compliance Through Conciliation 
One policy concern motivating courts adjudicating Title VII liti-
gation is the desire to protect the integrity of the conciliation require-
ment.41 Congress intended to enforce Title VII rights primarily 
through informal means.42 Until 1972, the EEOC could only seek 
voluntary compliance,43 and a cause of action was granted only to-
individuals.44 The 1972 amendments allow the EEOC to bring 
suit.45 Since Congress expressly made the Commission's power to 
sue dependent upon the failure of conciliation,46 the courts have con-
cluded that Congress still favors conciliation as the primary method 
of handling charges of employment discrimination.47 The Act as 
1976), and EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (all 
granting summary judgment), with EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 
1978) (dismissing suit), and EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(reversing District Court dismissal for lack of jurisdiction), and EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten 
Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (percuriam) (same result as Magnolia), and courts that 
emphasize judicial efficiency, compare EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. 
Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979) (granting summary judgment), and EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 
436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977), and EEOC v. Brown Transp. Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1062 (N.D. Ga 1976) (all granting partial summary judgment), with EEOC v. 
McLean Trucking Co., 64 F.R.D. 643 (W.D. Tenn. 1974), modified, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 302 (1974) (dismissing suit), revd and remanded, 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975). 
41. See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341, 349 (D. 
Mass. 1979); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678, 683 (M.D. Fla. 1978); 
EEOC v. Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); EEOC v. 
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237,241 (N.D. Ala. 1974); EEOC v. Westvaco 
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 988 (D. Md. 1974). Several cases dealing with other prerequisites to 
suit by the EEOC demonstrate similar deference to the congressional policy favoring concilia-
tion. See EEOC v. Brown Transp. Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1062, 1068 (N.D. 
Ga. 1976) (requirement that scope of judicial complaint not exceed the scope of the charge); 
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Va. 1974) (same), revd., 532 F.2d 359 (4th 
Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273,275 (D. Md. 1973) (re-
quirement that EEOC notify employer of failure of conciliation). 
42. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) ("Cooperation and vol-
untary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving [the] goal [of Title 
Vil]."); Moore v. City of San Jose, 615 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1980) ("In enacting Title VII, 
Congress has specifically endorsed voluntary compliance and settlement as the preferred 
means of achieving the elimination of unlawful employment discrimination."). 
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259-61 (amended 
1972); see General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980). 
44. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325 (1980). 
45. See note 2 supra. 
46. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 272 (4th Cir.) (The concili-
ation provision "has been construed to create an express condition on the commission's power 
to sue."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 366 F. 
Supp. 273,275 (D. Md. 1973) ("The language of the Act conveys a clear Congressional intent 
that a bona fide attempt at conciliation by the EEOC is a precondition to its filing suit."). 
47. See EEOC v. American Natl. Bank, 652 F.2d ll76, ll84 (4th Cir. 198l)(''The EEOC's 
new role as an enforcer, however, was not intended to diminish its role as conciliator."), cert. 
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1982) (No. 81-2358); EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. 
Supp. 202,203 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (''The Congressional intent that the EEOC should primarily 
attempt to eradicate discrimination in employment through conciliation was not changed [by 
the 1972 Act] •... "); EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1977) 
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amended does not abandon efforts to seek voluntary compliance, but 
provides greater incentive for employers to comply voluntarily.48 
The courts, therefore, have reasoned that adjudicating disputes prior 
to serious conciliation efforts would undermine an important con-
gressional policy.49 
Both dismissal and summary judgment protect the integrity of 
the conciliation requirement. As long as the courts scrupulously re-
fuse to hear all suits brought by the EEOC without adequate concili-
ation efforts, the EEOC cannot circumvent the conciliation 
requirement. so Regardless of the disposition courts select, the EEOC 
("Although the 1972 Amendments gave the EEOC the power of an enforcer, they did not 
change its responsibility as a conciliator." (footnote omitted)); EEOC v. Pierce & Stevens 
Chem. Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1162, 1166 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foun-
dry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 242 (N.D. Ala. 1974). 
The support for conciliation is ambiguous in the legislative history of the 1972 amend-
ments. After the Act was reported out of committee, Senator Dominick introduced an amend-
ment replacing a provision authorizing the EEOC to issue cease and desist orders with the 
power to bring suit in federal district court. Senator Dominick intended his amendment to 
"take over at the level where conciliations fail .... " 118 CONG. REC. 589 (1972). Represen-
tative Perkins, the senior House conferee, held a similar opinion: "Only if conciliation proves 
to be impossible do we expect the Commission to bring action in Federal district court to seek 
enforcement." 118 CoNG. REC. 7563 (1972). Courts, relying on such statements, have rea-
soned that Congress intended to continue to rely primarily upon voluntary compliance. See, 
e.g., EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 988 (D. Md. 1974). 
The belief that the 1972 Amendments reflected unflagging support for conciliation, how-
ever, may merit reevaluation. Congress' disenchantment with conciliation was equally appar-
ent in the record. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 36; 118 CONG. REC. 4932 (1972) 
(Commission conciliated with total or partial success in fewer than half of all cases where 
reasonable cause was found.). At least one court believed Congress intended to relegate con• 
ciliation to the back seat and rely primarily on court action. See EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 
532 F.2d 359, 373 (4th Cir. 1976). 
48. See EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 449 (6th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell 
Co., 507 F.2d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 1974); H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 36, at 11, 1972 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 2147. 
49. See EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341, 349 (D. Mass. 
1979) ("If failure to comply with statutory procedures might be excused, ... courts could 
easily be transformed into the primary agency for Title VII enforcement, a result at odds with 
the statutory scheme."); EEOC v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678, 683 (M.D. Fla. 
1978) ("The only construction of the statute which is at all in harmony with the Congressional 
desire for conciliation is that the Commission's authority to sue is conditioned upon full com-
pliance with the administrative process - investigation, determination, and conciliation -
with respect to each discriminatory practice alleged."); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
366 F. Supp. 273 (D. Md. 1973). 
50. The EEOC might be able to circumvent the conciliation requirement by waiting for an 
individual to bring suit, then intervening in that action. The individual may sue regardless of 
the EEOC's failure to attempt conciliation. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645, 
652 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 918 (1969). The EEOC may be permitted to inter-
vene despite its failure to attempt conciliation. See Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 
558 F.2d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 1977). But see Harris v. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 479 F. Supp. 11 
(N.D. Ga. 1979). This technique is unreliable, since it is not certain that the individual will 
bring suit. In addition, the courts are alert to the possibility of attempted circumvention. See 
EEOC v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 506 F. Supp. 480,483 (D. Mass. 1981); National 
Org. for Women v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 73 F.R.D 467, 471 (D. Minn. 1977). Interven-
tion will be limited to the issues the individual could raise; the EEOC may not expand the 
scope of the individual suit. National Org.far Women, 73 F.R.D. at 471. 
December 1982) Note-Failure To Attempt Conciliation 443 
must attempt conciliation before the action may proceed. 
The Commission's attempts to complete conciliation are more ef-
fective after dismissal than summary judgment. The possibility of a 
second suit based on the same charges provides an incentive for the 
employer to negotiate after dismissal; the original action makes more 
credible the threat of subsequent legal action.51 In contrast, since 
summary judgment bars later government suits,52 it significantly 
reduces the incentive to make concessions. The threat of private ac-
tions53 or different charges54 exerts substantially less influence on the 
employer. 
B. Punishing EEOC Misconduct 
By refusing to hear actions absent an adequate attempt to resolve 
the dispute without litigation, some courts seem to see themselves as 
punishing EEOC misconduct. Although this punitive purpose does 
not explicitly appear as the reason for disposing of a case, the lan-
guage of some opinions suggests a desire to sanction Commission 
wrongdoing. In the first case to require conciliation prior to suit,55 
the court emphasized that the EEOC's "derelictions . . . were . . . 
bald and unambiguous violations of the plain language of its own 
rules,"56 and accused the EEOC of "fiout[ing] in essential particulars 
Title VII and its own regulations .... "57 In another suit, the court 
granted summary judgment after hearing evidence that the EEOC 
attorney "singlehandedly spoiled out-of-court settlement of this 
case."58 Appellate courts have reversed both dismissal and summary 
51. The district court in EEOC v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341, 
346 (D. Mass. 1979), acknowledged the "psychological factor of the imminent commencement 
of a lawsuit." Cf. Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 375 (8th Cir. 1974) (action 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act in which "[t]he District Court succinctly 
and perceptively held that '[v]oluntary compliance through conciliation, conference, and per-
suasion is more likely to be effected when the employer clearly understands that the matter will 
proceed at a level beyond that of the compliance officer if there is not a voluntary resolution of 
the dispute' "). 
52. See note 20 supra. 
53. "In cases posing the most profound consequences, respondents have more often than 
not shrugged off the Commission's entreaties and relied upon the unlikelihood of the parties 
suing them." H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 36, at 9, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS, at 
2144; see notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text. 
54. The employer can avoid new charges entirely by ending its discriminatory practices. 
While this result is desirable, the summary judgment has nonetheless permitted the employer 
to escape backpay liability to those persons injured by its past acts of discrimination. Dismis-
sal would preserve that potential liability despite prospective improvements. 
55. EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985 (D. Md. 1974). In Westvaco, the Commis-
sion filed suit without timely determination ofreasonable cause or any effort to conciliate. 372 
F. Supp. at 990. 
56. 372 F. Supp. at 993. 
57. 372 F. Supp. at 991. 
58. EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527,532 (10th Cir. 1978). The district court had found that 
the EEOC "improperly refused to continue to conciliate in good faith." 582 F.2d at 532. 
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judgment, holding that the lower courts had acted harshly.59 
Courts should not use summary judgment as a sanction against 
EEOC misconduct. The res judicata effect of summary judgment is 
drastic, especially given the availability of lesser but effective penal-
ties. Egregious Commission misconduct, such as harassment, has 
not prevailed as an affirmative defense to EEOC charges, 60 or as 
grounds for summary judgment.61 Inadequate conciliation may not 
involve Commission misconduct, 62 so that the harsh penalty of sum-
mary judgment seems inappropriate. 
Courts may effectively punish EEOC misconduct while dis-
missing the suit. Dismissal itself imposes a minor sanction; the 
Commission, already overburdened, 63 must take the time not only to 
refile the suit, but also to remedy the defect in conciliation that led to 
the dismissal.64 If dismissal alone offers an inadequate penalty, 
courts may provide additional sanctions by awarding attorneys' fees 
against the Commission.65 Several courts have held that dismissal 
qualifies a defendant as a "prevailing party" for purposes of award-
ing costs.66 Such a sanction bears a more rational relationship to the 
Commission's misconduct than does permanently precluding a po-
59. See EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); 
EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). See 
also EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(District Court, in dismissing inadequately conciliated suit, found: "The EEOC's obvious dis-
regard for such promulgated regulations is the apex of unreasonableness."). 
60. EEOC v. First Natl. Bap.k, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
917 (1981). 
61. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. Supp. 1245, 1253-54 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (EEOC 
misconduct amounting to harassment is not appropriate ground for summary judgment). 
62. See C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 23, at 330 ("[M]ost defaults 
[of statutory requirements] probably occur not because of the agency's willful refusal to com-
ply but rather from the inevitable mistakes inherent in processing a huge volume of charges 
with inadequate resources."). 
63. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 369-70 (1977); B. ScHLEI & P. 
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMATION LAW 769 ()976). 
64. Failure to remedy the misconduct could lead to a second dismissal. The pattern could 
continue indefinitely. Misconduct prejudicing defendants could lead to a permanent dismissal. 
See Jones v. Bell Helicopter Co., 614 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1980). 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). The Ninth Circuit approved the award of attorneys' 
fees in a case dismissed for failure to conciliate in EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 
609 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) 
(Court may award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case "upon a finding 
that the _plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not 
brought m subjective bad faith."). 
66. See EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978); 
see also EEOC v. First Natl. Bank, 614 F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
917 (1981) (reversing award of attorney's fees because it reversed the dismissal); EEOC v. 
McLean Trucking Co., 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 301 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (awarding costs 
but not attorneys' fees). Whenever costs are awarded the court may, in its discretion, include 
attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). The statute does not, however, distinguish 
cases in which attorneys' fees are appropriate from cases in which only court costs may be 
awarded. § 2000e-5(k). 
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tentially meritorious action against discriminatory employment 
practices. 
. 
C. Promoting Judicial Efficiency 
Courts have refused to hear suits before adequate conciliation 
because of concern for judicial efficiency. When the EEOC brings 
several different charges against a defendant without pursuing con-
ciliation regarding all the charges, two dangers arise: the Commis-
sion may require more discovery, and the suit may cover a broader 
range of issues, requiring a longer and more complex trial. 67 Courts 
therefore prefer to dispose of charges which the Commission has not 
made the subject of settlement negotiations, and proceed expedi-
tiously with a simpler trial.68 
Dismissal prevents protracted litigation by permitting trial to 
proceed only on those issues properly prepared by the EEOC.69 
Summary judgment achieves the same advantage, but at the cost of 
preventing subsequent action on the counts severed from the 
complaint. 
Courts that are concerned about judicial efficiency may hesitate 
to dismiss inadequately conciliated suits. Duplicative litigation may 
follow the bringing of similar charges against a number of defen-
dants, some of whom are dismissed.70 Summary judgment prevents 
duplicative litigation. If the court decides the ·case for some defen-
61. See EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (granting partial 
summary judgment on allegations concerning management, professional and technical person-
nel, but retaining allegations concerning flight attendants). The Allegheny court believed that 
limiting suit to the narrower issues would speed discovery and simplify the trial. 436 F. Supp. 
at 1307. 
68. q: EEOC v. Brown Transp. Corp., 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1062, 1068-69 
(N.D. Ga. 1976) (dictum supports limiting scope of EEOC investigation to prevent unduly 
delaying relief to charging party). 
69. In some cases, the court may grant a motion to strike some charges. See, e.g., EEOC v. 
Sherwood Medical Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978). The net effect is the same. The 
stricken count is not properly before the court, therefore no judgment on its merits is reached. 
70. See EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341, (D. Mass. 1979) 
(I.B.E.W. I); EEOC v. International Bhd. ofElec. Workers, 506 F. Supp. 480 (D. Mass. 1981) 
(I.B.E.W. II); cf. EEOC v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1975) (permit-
tingjoinder of union not named in employee's charge against employer). TheLB.E. W. I court 
dismissed the EEOC's suit against the International for failure to attempt conciliation despite 
the potential for inconsistent judgments against the local, which had participated in concilia-
tion. 476 F. Supp. at 350. Subsequently, the LB.E. W. II court held that the charging party, 
who had intervened in the EEOC suit, could proceed independently against the International 
despite dismissal of the EEOC complaint against it. 506 F. Supp. at 483. In dictum, the court 
mentioned the possibility of EEOC intervention in the private plaintiffs action against the 
International. 506 F. Supp. at 483. 
Theoretically duplication could arise if the EEOC brought two different charges against the 
same employer, but only attempted conciliation on one of them. Different charges, however, 
may not raise similar issues of fact. Facts relevant to a race discrimination charge, for exam-
ple, may not apply to a sex discrimination charge. Thus, dismissal might pave the way for two 
simple suits rather than one complex suit. See EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 
1300, 1307 (W.D. Pa. 1977). 
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dants on the merits, the EEOC cannot resurrect the charges against 
them in a subsequent action. Elimination of the EEOC suit, how-
ever, may give rise to several individual suits,71 undercutting judicial 
efficiency. 
Dismissal poses a more substantial risk of duplication. If concili-
tion with the dismissed defendants fails and the EEOC brings a sec-
ond suit against them, the adjudication of substantially similar issues 
in separate cases may squander judicial resources.72 Both the courts 
and the Commission, however, can minimize the threat of duplica-
tion. Courts may avoid duplication either by joining dismissed de-
fendants73 or by dismissing all defendants.74 If some defendants are 
dismissed fairly early in the proceedings, the EEOC may be able to 
remedy its failure and file suit again before the original suit is ready 
for trial. The court may then decide to consolidate the actions for 
trial.75 When the court dismisses one defendant, the EEOC could 
enhance the court's consolidation effort by voluntarily dismissing its 
suit against the others.76 If conciliation efforts against the dismissed 
defendant fail, the Commission could refile the entire action. 77 
Either dismissal or summary judgment accommodates the courts' 
reasons for refusing to hear inadequately conciliated suits - encour-
11. But see note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
12. See EEOC v. Allegheny Airlines, 436 F. Supp. 1300, 1307 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (recogniz-
ing EEOC concerns regarding delays and wasted resources, but holding that such factors did 
not outweigh those favoring dismissal). 
73. Courts are understandably reluctant to permit the EEOC to join parties not privy to 
conciliation talks. In the only case in which a court joined an indispensable party to an EEOC 
suit, it appears that the Commission did attempt some conciliation with that party. See EEOC 
v. McLean Trucking Co., 525 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1975), revg. 64 F.R.D. 643 (W.D. Tenn, 
1974), mod!fted, 1 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 302 (1974); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 19(a); cf. 
Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., Portland, Me., 435 F.Supp. 1063, 1074 (D. 
Me. 1977) (private plaintiff failed to name party in charge filed with EEOC; dismissal denied 
where party was indispensable and received actual notice). 
14. See EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202 (W.D. Okla. 1978); see also FED, R, 
C1v. P. 19(b). 
75. FED. R. C1v. P. 42(a) gives courts authority to consolidate actions to promote efficient 
judicial administration. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 97 (3d ed. 1976). 
16. See FED. R. C1v. P. 41(a). 
77. FED. R. C1v. P. 41(a)(2) permits voluntary dismissal only upon "such terms and condi-
tions as the court deems proper." Id. The court could effectively veto the EEOC's voluntary 
dismissal by specifying that such dismissal would be with prejudice. The court, thus, has 
power to decide that proceeding promptly against the remaining defendant outweighs the de-
sire to keep the actions consolidated. 
A delay in proceedings against the defendant properly before the court may prejudice that 
defendant by subjecting it to greater liability for backpay than it would face if the suit pro-
ceeded at once. However, the court need not force the defendant to assume that liability in 
order to preserve a unified suit. The court could utilize its equitable powers to adjust the period 
for which the defendant is liable for back pay to account for the delay in proceedings. Cf. 
EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1976) (limiting backpay liability to 
two years before employer actually received notice of sex discrimination claims). Courts 
should consider limiting defendant backpay liability for the period of delay as a condition 
upon voluntary dismissal. 
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aging conciliation, punishing EEOC misconduct, and promoting ju-
dicial efficiency. Dismissal does pose some risk of duplicative 
litigation, but the courts and the Commission can minimize the 
chance of duplication. More importantly, dismissal, because it 
leaves the EEOC free to refile the same charges after conciliation is 
perfected, interferes less with Title VII's aim of eliminating employ-
ment discrimination than does summary judgment, which bars sub-
sequent suit under the doctrine of res judicata. Generally, courts 
should secure the central goal of Title VII before seeking to meet 
secondary goals.78 Accordingly, dismissal is the appropriate dispo-
sition for inadequately conciliated cases. 
III. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 12(B) 
Some courts have characterized the conciliation requirement as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. Because dismissal for lack of juris-
diction is always without prejudice,79 this procedure initially appears 
attractive. More rigorous analysis, however, indicates that the ap-
propriate procedure is dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, provided for in rule 12(b)(6). Since such 
a disposition is presumptively prejudicial, the court should expressly 
note in its order that the dismissal is without prejudice to an action 
brought once the Commission has satisfied the conciliation require-
ment. 80 The provision of rule 12 that the consideration of material 
outside the pleadings requires treating and disposing of a 12(b)(6) 
motion as a motion for summary judgment does not pose an insur-
mountable obstacle to this approach. 
· A. Jurisdictional Analysis 
Some courts have refused to hear cases prior to adequate concili-
ation for lack of jurisdiction.81 The procedural requirements of Title 
78. See Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("We do not 
believe that the procedures of Title VII were intended to serve as a stumbling block to the 
accomplishment of the statutory objective."); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 432 F. 
Supp. 390, 397 (W.D. La. 1977) (administrative procedure "should not override the overall 
purpose of Title VII, to provide redress from employment discrimination"). 
79. FED. R. C1v. P. 4I(b) 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdi-
vision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as 
an adjudication upon the merits. 
80. See FED. R. C1v. P. 4l(b). The rule allows the court to specify that its dismissal is not 
an adjudication of the merits. 
81. EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1979); 
EEOC v. Wilson & Co., 452 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (W.D. Okla. 1978); EEOC v. Raymond 
Metal Prods. Co., 385 F. Supp. 907, 911-12 (D. Md. 1974), ajfd in part, revd in part and re-
manded on other grounds, 530 F.2d 590 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. United States Pipe & Foun-
dry Co., 375 F. Supp. 237, 244 (N.D. Ala. 1974); see EEOC v. Magnolia Elec. Power Assn., 635 
F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1981) (district court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds); EEOC v. Pet, Inc., 
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VII, like conciliation, establish conditions precedent to suit;82 these 
courts have also held that satisfying the conciliation requirement is 
necessary for jurisdiction. 83 
If conciliation is a jurisdictional prerequisite, courts must dismiss 
for lack of jurisdiction suits that do not fulfill that prerequisite. 84 A 
summary judgment order under these circumstances exceeds the trial 
court's authority, for without jurisdiction the court cannot adjudicate 
the merits. 85 Respect for the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts 
therefore precludes, rather than justifies, granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment. 
The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that a motion to dis-
miss for failure to comply with a condition precedent can be treated 
like a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which does not bar 
subsequent suits. 86 The Fifth Circuit recently applied this doctrine 
to limit the res judicata consequences of a summary judgment order 
predicated on the Commission's failure adequately to investigate a 
discrimination charge. In Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hospital,81 
the individual claimant brought suit after the district court had 
Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (district court dismissed on 
jurisdictional grounds); see also EEOC v. American Natl. Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185 (4th Cir. 
1981) (found conciliation jurisdictional, but held conciliation efforts adequate on the facts), 
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1982) (No. 81-2358). 
82. E.g., EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (D. Del. 1974), ajfd., 516 F.2d 1297 (3d 
Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Container Corp. of America, 352 F. Supp. 262, 265 (M.D. Fla. 1972), 
83. See note 81 supra and accompanying text. The requirement that the EEOC defer to 
action by state employment discrimination agencies has been considered jurisdictional, Carey 
v. New York Gaslight Club, Inc., 598 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1979), ajfd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 
54 (1980). In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982), the Supreme Court 
recently reversed the Seventh Circuit's holding that timely filing of an EEOC charge was a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. 102 S. Ct. at 1132. 
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(l) authorizes dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
85. A court without jurisdiction to hear the merits of a case cannot render judgment on the 
merits. E.g., O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., 551 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1977); Dassinger v. 
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 505 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Thompson v. United 
States, 291 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1961); Campbell v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Intl., 452 F. Supp. 930 
(W.D. Pa. 1978). 
86. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961). The Court created an exception to 
dismissal operating as an adjudication on the merits for "those dismissals which are based on a 
plaintiffs failure to comply with a precondition requisite to the Court's going forward to deter-
mine the merits of his substantive claims." 365 U.S. at 285. Cf. Schuy v. Susquehanna Corp., 
419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (dictum that dismissal on grountls of 
prematurity must be without prejudice). The Costello approach of selectively characterizing 
preconditions to suit as jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional has been justly condemned for 
adopting an amorphous standard_based on an inaccurate use of the word •~urisdictional." See 
18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4435, at 335 
(1969) ("This method of interpreting Rule 4l(b) is directly objectionable because it involves so 
slippery a method of manipulating the concept of jurisdiction."), The application of the Cos• 
tello doctrine to Title VIl's conciliation requirement illustrates its deficiencies. 
87. 614 F.2d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 1980); see also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 490 F. 
Supp. 1245, 1258 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (citing Costello) (dismissal for failure to conciliate is not on 
the merits and should be without prejudice). 
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found, inter alia, the Commission's investigation efforts insufficient 
to sustain a suit. 88 The district court had cast this conclusion in the 
procedural form of a summary judgment order, 89 which the defen-
dant interposed as a bar to the second suit by the individual.90 Judge 
Wisdom reasoned that because the district court had characterized 
the investigation requirement as a ''jurisdictional prerequisite," it 
had no power to order summary judgment on the merits.91 Conse-
quently, a jurisdictional disposition of the Commission's action 
could not preclude the subsequent suit by the individual claimant.92 
Under this analysis, the same jurisdictional deficiency that renders 
summary judgment improper ensures that an erroneous summary 
judgment order will not bar a subsequent suit once the plaintiff can 
establish the jurisdictional prerequisites. 
Although elegant, the Trovillion approach does not provide a 
comprehensive solution to the problem of selecting a procedural de-
vice to dipose of Title VII suits for inadequate conciliation efforts. 
First, not all courts agree that the conciliation requirement must be 
fulfilled before jurisdiction to hear the suit exists.93 Some courts 
deny that conciliation is a jurisdictional requirement.94 Other courts 
fail to consider jurisdiction explicitly in refusing to hear an inade-
quately conciliated case.95 Still other courts hold conciliation juris-
88. 614 F.2d at 522-23. 
89. EEOC v. King's Daughters Hosp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 484, 490 (S.D. 
Miss. 1976). 
90. 614 F.2d at 523. 
91. 614 F.2d at 522-24. The opinion does not clearly state whether the statutory precondi-
tions to suit are jurisdictional, or simply procedural prerequisites which should be treated like 
jurisdictional questions. A similar ambiguity pervades the Costello opinion. Regardless of the 
terminology, a finding that the preconditions to suit have not been met is outcome determina-
tive, rather than a question of forum or procedure. The critique in the text applies to any 
disposition of a claim for failure to meet prerequisites to suit that purports to be other than "on 
the merits." 
92. 614 F.2d at 525. 
93. Although courts have stated that conciliation is jurisdictional or not jurisdictional, they 
have failed to develop a reasoned approach for determining whether a procedural requirement 
is jurisdictional. See, e.g., EEOC v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 476 F. Supp. 341, 
344-45 (D. Mass. 1979) (jurisdictional); EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 991 (D. 
Md. 1974) (not jurisdictional). Instead, the courts' approaches seem results-oriented. Simi-
larly, the Supreme Court in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 102 S. Ct. 1127 (1982), after apply-
ing a detailed three part test, concluded: 
By holding compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so 
requires, we honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the 
particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer. 
102 S. Ct. at 1135 (emphasis added). 
94. See EEOC v. Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 991 (D. Md. 1974) (failure to concili-
ate does not go to jurisdiction); see also EEOC v. Standard Forge & Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392, 
1395 (5th Cir. 1974) (statutory procedures are conditions precedent, and may be pleaded 
generally). 
95. Several courts dismiss without reaching the question of jurisdiction. See EEOC v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1981); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 
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clictional, but reason that any attempt to conciliate satisfies the 
requirement sufficiently to provide the court with jurisdiction; ade-
quacy of conciliation does not present a jurisdictional problem.96 
Precedents that characterize the conciliation requirement as substan-
tive rather than jurisdictional leave little room for the Truvillion ap-
proach, limiting the number of jurisdictions that may rely on it. 
Second, the jurisdictional label does not accurately describe the 
operation of the conciliation requirement. Whether or not inade-
quate conciliation efforts implicate jurisdiction, they certainly pre-
clude judicial relief by preventing the court from hearing the merits. 
Under the jurisdictional approach, no court has jurisdiction to hear 
such a claim. Only a transparent fiction can maintain the distinction 
between substance and jurisdiction in such cases.97 In similar cases 
of redundant jurisdictional and substantive prerequisites to recovery, 
the desire to do justice on the merits has persuaded the courts to treat 
the condition as substantive.98 In perhaps the closest analogy, fail-
F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); see also EEOC v. Sherwood Medical 
Indus., 452 F. Supp. 678 (M.D. Fla. 1978); EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. Supp. 
562 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (granting motions to strike). 
96. See EEOC v. California Teachers Assn., 534 F. Supp. 209, 213 n.3 (N.D. Calif. 1982) 
("The sufficiency of a conciliation effort by the EEOC does not present a jurisdictional ques-
tion, so long as a conciliation attempt has been made."); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 
F. Supp. 241,262 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("Attempt to conciliate is the prevailing standard .... The 
sufficiency of the conciliation effort presents a question of whether the court should stay the 
proceeding for further conciliation, not whether it has jurisdiction over the cause."); see also 
EEOC v. North Cent. Airlines, 475 F. Supp. 667, 669 (D. Minn. 1979) ("When absolutely no 
conciliation has occurred, the courts have no jurisdiction over the EEOC suit.") (emphasis 
original). 
97. The classic test of subject matter jurisdiction is whether "the right of the petitioners to 
recover under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United 
States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another." Bell v. Hood, 
327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946). "Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated ... by the possibility that the 
averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For 
it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the 
merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction." 327 U.S. at 682. 
98. Motions to dismiss Sherman Act complaints offer a close analogy, because the statute 
authorizes a cause of action only for practices "in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Thus recovery on the merits depends on an interstate 
commerce nexus sufficient to sustain subject matter jurisdiction. The courts have been reluc-
tant to grant 12(b)(l) motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in such cases. Rather, they 
prefer to hear the merits, initially through a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. This approach ensures that the complaint will be viewed in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff, and more frequently enables the plaintiff to initiate discovery which may rein-
force his claim to both jurisdiction and recovery. "(T]he better analysis [would be] to treat an 
insufficient plea of effect upon interstate commerce as a failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted rather than lack of jurisdiction (in the sense of power) over the subject 
matter." Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp., Sll F.2d 678,681 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc),revd, 
425 U.S. 738 (1976). The Supreme Court agreed that the issue should be cast as a 12(b)(6) 
motion, but noted that "[i]n either event, the critical inquiry is into the adequacy of the nexus 
between respondents' conduct and interstate commerce that is alleged in the complaint." 425 
U.S. at 742 n.l. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 549 F.2d 884, 897-98 (3d Cir. 
1977); A. Cherney Disposal Co. v. Chicago & Suburban Refuse Disposal Assn., 484 F.2d 751, 
759 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 (1974); McBeath v. Inter-American Citizens for 
Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 363 (5th Cir.) (''where the factual and jurisdictional issues are 
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ure to exhaust administrative remedies is generally viewed as a sub-
stantive question properly within judicial discretion, rather than as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial authority.99 These considera-
tions support characterizing the conciliation requirement as an es-
sential element of the Commission's cause of action, unencumbered 
by amorphous jurisdictional pretensions.100 
Finally, the Supreme Court's recent characterization of Title 
VII's filing periods as substantive rather than jurisdictional casts se-
rious doubt on the Truvillion approach. In Zipes v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 101 the Court held "compliance with the filing period to be 
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a re-
quirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so re-
quires." 102 Three considerations - the structure of Title VII, the 
congressional policy underlying the Act, and the reasoning of prior 
cases - led the Court to this result. 103 Applied to the conciliation 
requirement, these considerations suggest rejecting the jurisdictional 
approach. 
In Zipes, the Court noted Title VII's jurisdictional provision is 
separate from, and makes no mention of, the timely filing require-
ments.104 This analysis applies to the conciliation requirement as 
well. 105 The Court also relied on evidence of congressional purpose 
completely intermeshed the jurisdictional issues should be referred to the merits, for it is im-
possible to decide the one without the other''), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 896 (1967). 
99. Absent a statutory exhaustion provision that speaks directly to jurisdiction, such as that 
presented in Weinberger v. Salli, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), the exhaustion requirement is not an 
inflexible jurisdictional prerequisite but a judicial doctrine to be adapted to the facts of each 
particular case. See McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969); South Dakota v. An-
drus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1192 n.l (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980); Association of Natl. 
Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1156-58 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980); 
Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 250, 252-53 (9th Cir. 1978). Since Title VII's conciliation 
requirement does not directly address jurisdiction, see notes 104-07 i,ifra and accompanying 
text, this analogy suggests that the conciliation prerequisite is nonjurisdictional. Moreover, in 
the exhaustion context, adjudication by the courts ousts the jurisdiction of executive agencies, 
implicating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. This concern does not apply to 
Title VIl's conciliation requirement, which has the object of committing the resolution of the 
dispute to the parties themselves, rather than to another branch of the government. 
100. Even courts that adopt jurisdictional language recognize this reality. ''These courts 
and others sometimes speak in terms of the defect being jurisdictional. But often they do 
assert continuing authority over the matter." EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 
1978). The Truvillion court, for example, notes that "[t]he requirements of E.E.O.C.'s notice to 
the respondent and a good faith investigation by the E.E.O.C. in a loose sense might be treated 
as jurisdictional. They are, however, nothing more than procedural prerequisites to the court's 
determination of the substantive issues." 614 F.2d at 524. 
101. 102 S.Ct. 1127 (1982). 
102. 102 S.Ct. at 1135. 
103. 102 S.Ct. at 1132. 
104. 102 S.Ct. at 1132-33. 
105. The conciliation requirement is imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)(l) (1976); the ju-
risdictional provision is contained in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(t)(3). The conciliation proviso does 
not refer to jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional provision does not mention conciliation. 
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contained in the relevant legislative history. 106 With respect to con-
ciliation, Congress plainly intended to limit the Commission's ability 
to sue without appropriate settlement efforts, rather than to limit the 
authority of the district courts. 107 The Supreme Court has not de-
cided a case turning on the characterization of the conciliation re-
quirement, and the Zipes opinion suggests the danger of relying on 
the use of the jurisdictional label in dicta. 108 The last element of the 
Court's rationale, therefore, does not apply to analysis of the concili-
ation requirement. To the extent available from Zipes, Supreme 
Court guidance suggests viewing the conciliation prerequisite as sub-
stantive rather than jurisdictional. 
Even if the conciliation requirement does amount to a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite, the district courts should carefully discriminate 
between summary judgment and dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Admittedly, summary judgment would not bar a subsequent suit if 
the conciliation requirement is jurisdictional.109 But the jurisdic-
tional analysis itself denies the trial court the authority to issue such 
an order on the merits. 110 The possibility of reversal on appeal does 
little to diminish the need to avoid error at trial. 
B. Consideration of Material Outside the Pleadings Under Rule 
12(b) 
The problematic nature of the jurisdictional analysis suggests the 
more straightforward approach of a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim. Disposition under rule 12(b)(6) offers a more accurate, 
if still imperfect, procedural response to inadequate conciliation ef-
forts.111 But rule 12(b) imposes one additional hurdle to dismissal as 
distinguished from summary judgment: if the trial court considers 
factual material outside the pleadings in resolving the 12(b)(6) mo-
tion, it must treat the motion as one for summary judgment under 
106. 102 S.Ct. at 1133. 
107. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 272 (4th Cir.) (the con-
ciliation provision "has been construed to create an express condition on the commission's 
power to sue"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976) (emphasis added); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D. Md. 1973) ("The language of the Act conveys a clear 
Congressional intent that a bona fide attempt at conciliation hy the EEOC is a precondition to 
its filing suit." ( emphasis added)). 
108. See 102 S.Ct. at 1133. 
109. See Trovillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 1980). 
110. "[T]he general rule is that it is improper for a district court to enter a judgment under 
Rule 56 for defendant because of a lack of jurisdiction. . . . If the court has no jurisdiction, it 
has no power to enter a judgment on the merits and must dismiss the action." 10 C. WRIGHT 
& A. MILLER, supra note 18 at§ 2713 (1973) (footnotes omitted). 
111. Ideally, the Federal Rules should contain a specific provision for a dismissal without 
prejudice for failure to satisfy preconditions to suit. Until the Rules include such a provision, 
existing procedural devices must be adapted to achieve the most accurate disposition possible 
under the current Rules. 
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rule 56. 112 Since the Commission's complaint typically includes an 
assertion that the claim fulfills all statutory preconditions to suit, a 
finding of inadequate conciliation must depend on matters outside 
the pleadings. 113 A mechanical application of rule 12(b) would re-
quire granting summary judgment in cases where the defendant's af-
fidavits persuade the court that the Commission has not yet met the 
conciliation requirement. 
But the courts need not interpret the rule so woodenly. Treating a 
motion as one for summary judgment may mean no more than that 
the standard for granting or denying the motion to dismiss is identi-
cal to the standard for granting or denying a motion for summary 
judgment. District courts frequently word their orders in such cir-
cu~stances as granting a motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for 
summary judgment.114 It follows that the trial court could resolve 
the 12(b)(6) motion under the standards set for summary judgment, 
and then grant the motion as requested with a specific notation that 
the dismissal is without prejudice to the refiling of the complaint af-
ter adequate conciliation efforts. 115 Such an approach serves the un-
derlying purposes of the rule without violence to its language, and 
provides a procedural device by which to enforce the conciliation 
requirement without denying plaintiffs an ultimate adjudication of 
the merits. The fundamental purpose of the federal rules, to produce 
substantive justice rather than procedural artifice, supports such an 
interpretation.116 
112. FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6). 
113. Originally, several courts refused to permit the Commission to plead the conciliation 
requirement generally, on the ground that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a 
specific pleading of jurisdictional prerequisites. EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 364 F. Supp. 188 
(D. Md. 1973); EEOC v. Griffin Wheel, 360 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Ala. 1973); see FED. R. C1v. P. 
8(a). This practice ended in 1974 when the Fifth Circuit decided EEOC v. Standard Forge & 
Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975). While specifically 
refusing to comment on the question of jurisdiction, the court held that the EEOC could plead 
generally that it had fulfilled all conditions precedent to suit. 496 F.2d at 1395; see FED. R. 
C1v. P. 9(c). In subsequent cases, the courts have deferred to the "authoritative judicial inter-
pretation" of Standard Forge. EEOC v. United Aircraft Corp., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 
383 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D. Conn. 1974); accord, EEOC v. Times-Picayune Publishing Corp., 
500 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); EEOC v. Metro-
politan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1976). 
114. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 313 F. Supp. 1324, 1330 (N.D. Cal. 1970) ("defend-
ants' motion to dismiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment as allowed by Rule 12(b) 
Fed. R.Civ.P., should be and is hereby granted under Rule 56(b)."). 
115. One court, for example, issued an order to the effect that: 
respondents' motion to dimiss, treated as a motion for summary judgment, is granted with 
prejudice as to [some alle~ations] of petitioner's Petition. Respondent's motion to dismiss 
IS granted without prejudice as to [some allegations] of petitioner's Petition. Petitioner is 
granted leave to file a new action . . . . 
Zeidman v. United States Parole Comm., No. 77 Civ. 4709 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 1978). 
116. See FED. R. C1v. P. l; Acoustica Assocs. v. Powertron Ultrasonics Corp., 28 F.R.D. 
16 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. DuPont Textile Mills, 26 F. Supp. 236 
(M.D.Pa. 1939). 
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CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment based on inadequate conciliation efforts 
needlessly obstructs the pursuit of justice on the merits in Title VII 
actions. Dismissal without prejudice reflects greater fidelity to the 
congressional purpose of combatting employment discrimination, 
while satisfying the policy concerns of the courts confronted by pre-
mature litigation. Dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted offers the best available dis-
position of Title VII actions brought prior to the failure of required 
conciliation efforts. 
